The Political Economy of Institutional Change and Social Blocs in Switzerland: a Neorealist Approach
Explain and analyze institutional change using Amable and Palombarini’s neorealist approach (Amable and Palombarini 2005, 2008, 2023)
Switzerland as a case study
What social basis for a neoliberal transformation of the Swiss model ?
Research in three parts
| Social Bloc | Socio-political Groups | Policy Preferences |
|---|---|---|
| Liberal-conservative bloc | Large industrial, export-oriented and competitive firms, skilled workers and managers Medium and small domestic oriented firms, farmers |
Free-trade, low employment and social protection, low tax level Public transfers, protection from international competition |
| Left bloc | Socio-cultural professionals, workers from the public sector Workers from the private sector |
State intervention, social protection, increase in real wage Real wage increase, social & employment protection, protection from international competition |
Brahmin left versus merchant right hypotheses
Bourgeois bloc hypotheses
8 questions as indicators to endogenously infer clusters (socio-political groups)
3 step approach to explore the relationships between clusters and party support/ political leaning
Selects data for 1999, a turning point in Swiss politics
Left bloc: clusters 2 and 8 are composed by wealthy and well-educated individuals, only cluster 12 is composed by popular elements. Potential targets of the left bloc, clusters 4 and 1, are rather composed by middle/lower-middle classes.
Liberal conservative bloc: clusters 3 and 7 are the least wealthy and educated; 9 and 10 among the most wealthy and educated.
Regression analysis:
Results validate brahmin left vs merchant right hypothesis more than the WPID’s own results
A few exceptions: difference between second highest and lowest income groups for left leaning
Analyses of the WPID extended to abstention and policy preferences
12 clusters model for 1999:
Dominant liberal conservative bloc, which is nonetheless divided over European integration and some economic issues (high income taxation)
The predominance of anti-EU and popular groups in the liberal conservative bloc could explain the failure of a neoliberal/bourgeois bloc strategy and the slowdown of the reforms after 2003.
Left bloc: incentives to attract parts of cluster 1 and 4, which are more moderate
Five levels for a theoretical framework for institutional change (Amable and Palombarini 2008):
My master’s thesis is only a first step for a neorealist analysis of Switzerland’s institutional change. There is still a lot to be done.
In further work, I envisage to do the following: